•   Submit to to del.icio.us   Submit to to digg   submit to to reddit   submit to to StumbleUpon   submit to to Google   Submit to to Yahoo!



http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/05/protecting-yourself-suspicionless-searches-while-t



Posted by Jennifer Granick

May 1st, 2008



The Ninth Circuit's recent ruling [1] (pdf) in United States v. Arnold

[2] allows border patrol agents to search your laptop or other digital

device without limitation when you are entering the country. EFF and

many civil liberties, travelers’ rights, immigration advocacy and

professional organizations are concerned that unfettered laptop searches

endanger trade secrets, attorney-client communications, and other

private information. These groups have signed a letter asking Congress

to hold hearings to find out what protocol, if any, Customs and Border

Protection (CBP) follows in searching digital devices and copying,

storing and using travelers’ data. The letter also asks Congress to pass

legislation protecting travelers’ laptops and smart phones from

unlimited government scrutiny.



If privacy at the border is important to you, contact Congress now and

ask them to take action! [3]



In the meantime, how can international travelers protect themselves at

the U.S. border, short of leaving their laptops and iPhones at home?



Many travelers practice security through obscurity. They simply hope

that no border agent will rummage through their private data. Too many

people enter the country each day for agents to thoroughly search every

device that crosses the border, and there is too much information stored

on most devices for agents to find the most revealing and confidential

tidbits. But for travelers who may be targeted based on their celebrity,

race or other distinguishing factor, obscurity is not an option. As last

week's news that Microsoft is giving away forensic tools that can

quickly search an entire hard drive on a USB “thumb drive” shows, it

won't be long before customs agents can efficiently perform a thorough

search on every machine. So long as there are no protocols or oversight

for these searches, every traveler's personal information is at risk.





Encryption is one (imperfect) answer.



If you encrypt your hard drive with strong crypto, it will be

prohibitively expensive for CBP to access your confidential information.

This answer is imperfect for two reasons—one is practical, the other is

technological.



Practically, the government has not disclosed CBP's laptop search

practices, despite our Freedom of Information Act lawsuit for these

documents. We don't know what a border patrol agent will do when

confronted with an encrypted machine. One possibility is that the agent

will simply give up and let the traveler pass with her belongings. Other

possibilities are that the agent will turn the traveler and her machine

away at the border, or that he will seize the laptop and allow the

traveler to continue on. I suspect that on most occasions, CBP agents

confronted with encrypted or password-protected data tell the owner to

enter the password or get turned away, and the owner, eager to continue

her voyage or to return home, simply complies.



If you don't want to comply, CBP cannot force you to decrypt your data

or give over your password. Only a judge can force you to answer

questions, and then only if the Fifth Amendment does not apply. While no

Fifth Amendment right protects the data on your laptop or phone, one

federal court has held that even a judge cannot force you to divulge

your password when the act of revealing the password shows that you are

the person with access to or control over potentially incriminating

files. See In re Boucher, 2007 WL 4246473 (D. Vt. November 29, 2007).



If, however, you don't respond to CBP’s demands, the agency does have

the authority to search, detain, and even prohibit you from entering the

county. CBP has more authority to turn non-citizens away than it does to

exclude U.S. persons from entering the country, but we don't know how

the agents are allowed to use this authority to execute searches or get

access to password protected information. CBP also has the authority to

seize your property at the border. Agents cannot seize anything they

like (for example, your wedding ring), but we do not know what standards

agents are told to follow to determine whether they can and should take

your laptop but let you by.



Technologically, encryption is imperfect because even strong crypto can

be cracked when someone obtains the keys. Border agents can demand the

keys from travelers unwilling to face seizure or detention. Agents may

also be able to extract and use keys that are stored on the machine

itself. Generally, if you keep your keys with the laptop, in your head

or on your disk, then the encryption is easier to socially engineer or

break than if you keep the keys elsewhere. (Discussion of what

encryption techniques to use or avoid is beyond the scope of this post.)



Encryption aside, there may be other ways you can show CBP that your

laptop is indeed a normal computer and that you mean no harm while

keeping confidential information from prying eyes. Most operating

systems let users to create multiple accounts on a single machine. A

traveler could allow CBP to examine his own account, while storing

client data or trade secrets in a separate account “owned” by his law

firm or corporation. Under typical border search circumstances, this

might satisfy CBP concerns. However, simply storing information in a

different account—even one protected by a password—is not the same as

encrypting it. If CBP is interested, the most commonly used forensic

search tools can access and search non-encrypted data in every account

on the machine.



Law firms, corporations and other entities that routinely deal with

confidential information are handing their business travelers

forensically clean laptops loaded with only what the traveler needs for

that particular business trip. Leaving unnecessary data, like five years

of email, behind may be the best thing. Of course, if trade secrets or

client information are the reason for the trip, this plan will not help.



Another option is to bring a clean laptop and get the information you

need over the internet once you arrive at your destination, send your

work product back, and then delete the data before returning to the

United States. Historically, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

(FISA) generally prohibited warrantless interception of this information

exchange. However, the Protect America Act amended FISA so that

surveillance of people reasonably believed to be located outside the

United States no longer requires a warrant. Your email or telnet session

can now be intercepted without a warrant. If all you are concerned about

is keeping border agents from rummaging through your revealing vacation

photos, you may not care. If you are dealing with trade secrets or

confidential client data, an encrypted VPN is a better solution.



Finally, however useful these techniques might be to protect laptops,

travelers do not have this array of options for protecting data stored

on less configurable smart phones. Of course, many phones do have a lock

or password protection option, which travelers might consider enabling

before heading to the airport.



In sum, while you must submit yourself and your electronic devices to

warrantless and suspicionless searches at the border, you are not

legally obligated to decrypt information or reveal passwords. However,

if you fail to do so, the border agents may detain or search you, or

even seize the device. There are no options that provide perfect privacy

protection, but there are some options that reduce the likelihood that a

legitimate international traveler's confidential information will be

subjected to arbitrary and capricious examination.





Example Security Precaution



Attorney Alice needs to have confidential attorney-client privileged

information overseas. Before departure, she removes unnecessary

information, encrypts her hard drive with strong crypto and sets up a

login for a protected account and a travel account on her computer. To

access the confidential data, one would need to first login to the

protected account, and then open the encrypted files. Only Alice’s

employer (The Law Offices of Bob) knows the passwords to the account and

encrypted data, and keeps them secret until Alice arrives at her

destination. Bob then sends the passwords to Alice in an encrypted email

message.



Related Issues: Privacy, Travel Screening

Related Cases: US v. Arnold



[1] http://preview.tinyurl.com/3nsffc

[2] http://www.eff.org/cases/us-v-arnold

[3] http://www.eff.org/action/bordersearch







_______________________________________________

Attend Black Hat USA, August 2-7 in Las Vegas,

the world's premier technical event for ICT security experts.

Featuring 40 hands-on training courses and 80 Briefings

presentations with lots of new content and new tools.

Network with 4,000 delegates from 50 nations.

Visit product displays by 30 top sponsors in

a relaxed setting. http://www.blackhat.com





addto Add this link to... report Bury 


Comments Who Voted Related Links